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Are private schools really better than public schools, or is it simply that better students attend
private schools? Although a number of recent studies find that students perform better in private schools
(more specifically, Catholic schools), others do not. Typically, however, the instruments used to adjust
for nonrandom selection are weak. This study employs uniquely detailed local instruments and jointly
models selection into religious and nonreligious private high schools, relative to public high
schools—improving instrument power in predicting private sector attendance to roughly three times that
of prior studies. Failing to correct adequately for selection leads to a systematic upward bias in the
estimated treatment effect for religious schools, but a downward bias for nonreligious private schools.
With adequate correction, religious schools are modestly inferior in mathematics and science, while
nonreligious schools are substantially superior. However, minority students, particularly in urban areas,
benefit from religious schools. Other factors that may make both religious and nonreligious private
schools attractive include possibly better retention rates, increased security and discipline, and greater
opportunities for a variety of specialized school-day and extracurricular activities.School Choice and Student Performance:
Are Private Schools Really Better?
1. INTRODUCTION
Religion, politics, and schools are a volatile mixture in the national debate over various
proposals for school choice, proposals in which students would no longer be constrained to attend the
public-school district in which they live, but could instead use government-supplied vouchers or tuition
subsidies to offset the costs of attending a private school. The national debate has reached the level of
presidential politics and led to well-known private-school choice experiments such as those currently
underway in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Cleveland, Ohio.
Underlying the school-choice movement is the widely held belief that private schools respond to
competition in ways public schools do not, and consequently are superior to public schools in providing
educational services. Some basic empirical evidence seems to bear out this contention: Private-school
students routinely perform at a higher level on standardized tests and are more likely to graduate from
high school and attend college than their public-school counterparts, even with many other observed
differences, such as family income, parental education levels, and school inputs, held constant. Indeed,
despite substantial performance differentials between public- and private-school students, private
schools, especially religious schools, generally spend considerably less per pupil than do public schools.
If private-school students perform at higher levels at lower cost, proponents argue, clearly private
schools are superior to public schools.
Our purpose here is to investigate the relative academic performance of public and private
schools, relying upon uniquely detailed data and model specifications. A number of other studies have
also taken up the question of whether private schools are truly better than public schools. Early studies
(e.g., Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982; Coleman and Hoffer 1987; and Chubb and Moe 1990)2
Related studies in sociology include Noell (1982) and Bryk, Lee, and Holland (1993). Witte (1996)
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provides a critical summary of recent comparisons of public and private schools.
compare public and Catholic schools, often finding that Catholic schools outperform public schools,
even with the inclusion of extensive controls.  Critics of these findings (e.g., Goldberger and Cain 1982)
1
argue that they might be driven by selection bias: Students and parents, by the very act of seeking out a
private school, may signal attributes, both observed and unobserved, that are conducive to higher
educational achievement. If so, then models that do not control for this nonrandom selection will lead to
upward-biased estimates of the treatment effect of private schools. In fact, this argument is the primary
objection raised by many of the critics of school-voucher proposals. Opponents argue that public funding
for private-school attendance will drain public schools of many of the best students, leaving public
schools with a disproportionate share of the students most difficult to educate. Proponents counter that
the largest gains for students in private schools appear to be for low-achieving, low-income, and minority
students.
Recently several authors have sought to control for sector selection in modeling the treatment
effect of private schools. For instance, Evans and Schwab (1995, 1996), Sander and Krautmann (1995),
Sander (1996, 1997), Goldhaber (1996), and Neal (1997) compare the effects of public and Catholic
schools (or all private schools, in the case of Goldhaber) on standardized test scores, high-school dropout
probabilities, and other outcomes. These authors use a variety of instruments to identify the selection into
Catholic (or private) schools, including average tuition levels, religious affiliation, percentage of
Catholics in the county of residence, the density of Catholic schools in the area, and interactions between
religion and the region of the country and urbanicity, depending upon the study. Results of these efforts
are mixed. Evans and Schwab (1995, 1996) and Neal (1997) find strong evidence that Catholic schools
increase student achievement, especially for minorities and initial low achievers, but Sander (1996) finds3
Researchers commonly focus on mathematics (and science, when available), because schools appear to be
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relatively more important for these areas than to, say, reading, where raw differentials are typically much smaller
(Madaus et al. 1979), and because achievement in these areas is often linked most strongly to post-schooling
earnings (Murnane et al. 1995).
no significant effect. Goldhaber (1996) finds little evidence of either a positive treatment effect for
private schools (religious and nonreligious combined) or of significant selection bias.
The mixed evidence on the effects of private schools (and particularly, Catholic schools) may be
due to differences in dependent variables or particular samples, but may also be due to differences in the
instruments used by the varying authors to identify sector selection. In particular, the differences may be
due to the presence of weakly correlated instruments. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) illustrate how
weak instruments may lead to biased estimates of treatment effects. Indeed, in our data, previous
authors’ specifications rarely explain a substantial portion of the selection into the relevant private-
school sector, raising the possibility that the weak-instrument critique may hold for this literature. This
point is corroborated in work by Ludwig (1997), who also finds compelling evidence that prior authors’
instruments are weak.
We use data from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) administered by the
U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to measure public-
versus private-school differences in student mathematics and science performance.  In doing so, we offer
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two principal innovations to the literature comparing public and private schools. First, we permit greater
heterogeneity in treatment effects by distinguishing selection into and effects of religious and
nonreligious private schools, not just religious schools (or private schools as a group, in the case of
Goldhaber 1996). To estimate a multisector model that jointly models selection and student performance,
we use a two-stage polychotomous choice method suggested by Lee (1982) and described by Maddala
(1986). We first estimate a multinomial logit model in which public schools, as well as religious and
nonreligious private schools, are separate sectors, and then use a polychotomous choice equivalent to an4
inverse Mills’ ratio to correct for selection in switching regressions representing the achievement
function for the school sector the student actually attends.
The second innovation is that our instrument set for selection into private-school sectors has
roughly three times the incremental predictive power of the set of all instruments used in previous
studies. The improved power in accurately predicting religious and nonreligious private-sector choice is
attributable to our unique data. The restricted-access version of the NELS identifies individual public
schools, but not private schools. Even so, we are able to use school-specific information reported in the
NELS to match private schools in the NELS to those reported in a veritable census of private schools
maintained by Dun and Bradstreet. Once the locations of the private schools are identified, one can then
use detailed community-specific variables from a variety of supplemental sources to identify the
selection across public schools and both religious and nonreligious private schools.
Based upon our findings, the large, positive differences in test scores observed for students in
religious schools appear to be due in large measure to differential selection into that sector. With no
correction for nonrandom selection, large, significantly positive treatment effects in mathematics and
science achievement persist, even after we control for a standard set of student, family, and other
variables. However, for religious schools positive treatment effects do not remain after selection
correction with our detailed instruments. In fact, estimated religious school treatment effects are
significantly negative, though only modestly so, in both mathematics and science. Estimates for a variety
of student subgroups also indicate that failing to correct for selection leads to measurably overstated
estimates of the religious-school treatment effect. The treatment effect does remain significantly positive
for black and Hispanic students, particularly those in urban areas. Estimated treatment effects for
nonreligious private schools, however, become even more positive in both mathematics and science after
we control for nonrandom selection, suggesting that nonrandom selection arising from unobserved
attributes is negative in this sector. In a final exercise, we reconcile these results with those of other5
We exclude, here, studies of the ongoing Milwaukee school-voucher program (e.g., Witte 1994; Rouse
3
1996), which excludes participation of religious private schools.
authors by demonstrating how discrepancies are due to either the choice of instrument sets or the failure
to distinguish between religious and nonreligious private schools, not to choice of sample data or school-
outcome variable.
2. SCHOOL CHOICE AND SAMPLE-SELECTION BIAS
Table 1 illustrates the large performance differentials for students in public and private schools.
It presents unadjusted logarithmic differences in 12th-grade test scores in mathematics (and science) for
religious and nonreligious private schools relative to public schools based upon data from the NELS. In
mathematics, for example, the 11.5 (approximate) percentage-point difference in scores for religious
schools is large, roughly equivalent to the full two-year average gain in test scores between the 10th and
12th grades for all students. Similarly large gaps are observed for science scores. The public-private
differentials persist regardless of the way in which we split the sample, as shown in Table 1.
These comparisons, however, are unlikely to yield an accurate representation of differences in
school quality. Students who attend public and private schools differ in systematic ways. Some of these
differences are accounted for by the standard control variables used to predict student achievement (e.g.,
prior achievement level, family background variables, and school characteristics), but these observable
characteristics are unlikely to fully capture the nonrandom differences in sector selection. Unless they
do, the estimated treatment effects of private schools will be biased. As noted earlier, several authors
have recently jointly modeled sector selection and student achievement. In all cases but one, Goldhaber
(1996), these authors have restricted their comparison to public and Catholic schools.  Goldhaber
3
compares public schools to both Catholic and nonreligious private schools, but assumes that selection6
TABLE 1
Logarithmic Differences in Average 12th-Grade Mathematics Scores
(Comparison Group: Public Schools)
Religious Private vs. Nonreligious Private vs.
Group Public Schools Public Schools
Full sample 0.127** 0.258**
(0.013) (0.017)
Black and Hispanic students 0.132** n/a
(0.033)
Income > $50,000 0.038 0.112**
(0.024) (0.019)
Income < $25,000 0.129** 0.275**
(0.023) (0.046)
Top third, 8th grade 0.027** 0.037**
(0.009) (0.009)
Bottom third, 8th grade 0.095** 0.258**
(0.024) (0.057)
12th-grade science score, 0.073** 0.196**
full sample (0.008) (0.011)
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses beneath estimated logarithmic differences. An entry of 0.115
signifies an approximate 11.5 percent difference between the two sectors. Entries of n/a indicate that the
estimate is not available due to excessively small cell size. Sample includes students who attend the same






into Catholic and nonreligious private schools is identical (i.e., he uses the inverse Mills’ ratio derived
from a selection equation that pools Catholic and nonreligious private schools as the selection term in
separate achievement equations for Catholic and nonreligious schools).
Unlike prior studies, we estimate a model in which selection and achievement equations differ
explicitly for three sectors: public schools and religious and nonreligious private schools. Distinguishing
the three sectors avoids confounding potential differences among the sectors in either selection or
achievement. We experiment with other distinctions, such as separating Catholic schools from other
religious schools, but the latter sector is very small. One cannot reject the null that selection into Catholic
and other religious schools is the same. One can, however, reject the null that selection into religious and
nonreligious schools is the same. Hence, given the available evidence, the three-sector approach seems
the appropriate one to employ.
Selection-Correction Procedure
Maddala (1986) describes an estimator for a model with polychotomous choice, first suggested
by Lee (1982). In the current application, school selection s takes a value j={0, 1, 2}, representing the
three possible school sectors in our model. The selection equations should be viewed as behavioral
reduced-forms, reflecting the influence of both individual choice and potentially endogenous or
nonrandom sector supply. Thus, school selection is determined by
Denote as P the derived probability that individual i={1,...,N} selects school sector j. The second-stage j
achievement equation in sector j is￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
8
y = ￿￿x + ￿￿ + ￿  jj j  jj
where individual subscripts are suppressed, y is a school outcome, x is a vector of control variables, ￿
and ￿ are parameters, ￿ is an error term, and
The terms ￿ and ￿, respectively, are the standard normal pdf and cdf. Denoting by R the second-stage j
regressor matrix (including ￿), one can express the asymptotic covariance matrix as j
where ￿ = diag(￿  , ..., ￿ ), ￿  = ￿  + ￿  (P ), ￿ is the asymptotic covariance matrix of estimated ￿ = j 1j Nj ij ij ij
2- 1
[ ￿  , ..., ￿ ], and F = R￿ L , where L is a matrix of the derivatives of the ￿’s with respect to the logit 13 j j j j
parameters. Though this approach is straightforward, and has been used extensively in the urban
economics literature in particular, we also experiment with more restrictive instrumental-variables
specifications suggested by Dubin and McFadden (1984). These IV specifications yield comparable
results.
Empirical Specifications
Two sets of variables are required to implement the empirical model: variables that appear in
both the second-stage achievement functions and the polychotomous-choice model, and those excluded
from the second stage but used to explain sector selection in the first stage. Each instrument for sector
choice satisfies two criteria. It has significant incremental power (at the 5 percent level or better) in
explaining sector selection in the multinomial logit model, but no significant independent explanatory
power (even at the 10 percent level) in an academic achievement function that controls for private-school9
Tests of this criterion are possible because of overidentification, i.e., because the rank of the instrument
4
set exceeds the rank of the required sample-selection terms (in addition to nonlinearity).
The IRT tests, where students get modified examinations depending upon their previous examination
5
scores, are used in the NELS to reduce the problems associated with ceiling and floor effects.
Sander (1997) shows that differentiating between Catholic and non-Catholic religiosity is important when
6
using Catholic religion as an instrument for sector selection. This distinction, while significant in the student
achievement equations, does not change our estimated private school treatment effects.
selection.  Therefore, all the identifying instruments are significantly correlated with sector selection, but
4
any significant effect on student achievement in mathematics or science is transmitted only through
sector selection.
We adopt a standard set of variables for inclusion in the second-stage achievement regressions,
one roughly comparable to the sets used in other recent studies of public and private schools. As with
other studies, these equations yield predictions of the achievement gain in each sector for a student with
specific characteristics, without school-based inputs held constant. Hence, they are not solely measures
of “technical” efficiency. The conceptual experiment is to place otherwise equivalent students in
different school environments. Appendix 1 offers descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables
included in either the first or second stages. The dependent variable in the second-stage regressions is the
natural logarithm of the NELS 12th-grade item response theory (IRT) mathematics or science test.  To
5
ensure that each student attends the same school for the period of measured academic achievement, the
sample includes all NELS students who attended the same public or private school in both 10th and 12th
grades. Sample attrition and dropouts are examined in Section 3.
The control variables in the second-stage achievement equations are dummy variables for
gender, race, Hispanic ethnicity; interactions between gender and, in turn, race and ethnicity; the family’s
socioeconomic status (a continuous variable constructed by NCES from parent-reported data on family
income, parental education, and parental occupation); a dummy variable for a two-parent household; a
dummy variable for whether the parent(s) attends religious services “often” or “frequently”;  seven
610
Evans and Schwab (1995, 1996) use Catholic religion as an instrument. However, in our data, the
7
instrument validity tests suggest that religion belongs in both the first- and second-stage equations. Murnane,
Newstead, and Olsen (1985) and Sander (1996) report a similar finding.
We also estimate specifications in which we only consider students with the relevant choices in their
8
counties. Our results do not change.
In specifying the relevant geographic area, we assume that students go to school in the county where they
9
live—on the presumption that most parents look at private schools beyond their immediate neighborhood but, at the
other extreme, do not consider all schools in a large multicounty metropolitan area. We know where public-school
students live, but must impute the county of residence for private-school students. Hence, we exclude military and
other boarding schools to ensure reliable imputations.
religion variables (Catholic, Baptist, fundamentalist Christian denominations, Jewish, Muslim, Eastern
religions, and no religious affiliation, with other religious affiliations, mostly Protestant, as the omitted
category), the natural logs of the student’s relevant 8th- and 10th-grade test scores, and nine Census-
subregion dummies reflecting regional variations in achievement.  
7
The sector-selection equations include all variables in the second stage, as well as other variables
that should influence sector selection. These identifying instruments are suggested by Constitutional and
other limitations on public schools (e.g., religious instruction), heterogeneity in the service population for
the locally provided public education, as well as variables likely to magnify the importance of local
heterogeneity. Some of these variables are motivated by work in industrial organization by Downes and
Greenstein (1996) on the entry of private schools into local markets, and by other recent work on public-
private school choice (e.g., Lankford and Wyckoff 1992; Lankford, Lee, and Wyckoff 1995). Hence, the
instrument set includes the urbanicity of the school’s county (variables reflecting central or suburban
counties in a Metropolitan Statistical Area), three school-availability variables (separate variables for
whether the county has a Catholic private school, a nonreligious private school, or a private school
affiliated with the student’s stated religion),  and variables reflecting the demographic and economic
8
characteristics of the county and characteristics of the schools in the county.  In addition, the instrument
9
set includes variables reflecting the state’s percentage of private manufacturing workers who are
unionized, and the degree to which the state constitution or legislation permits teacher unionization.11
In a later section, we also explore the potential nonrandom selection or endogeneity of union status, as
10
well as differences in treatment effects by union status.
Family income is reported in the NELS only as a categorical variable.
11
Hoxby (1994) finds that concentration affects student achievement levels. While we also find this result
12
in a model that does not correct for selection, this result is no longer present when we correct for selection. Hence, it
appears that school concentration affects student achievement, at least in our data, primarily via sector selection.
We exclude mean or median housing price, however, because school quality is likely to be endogenously
13
capitalized into local housing prices.
These last variables are included to account for the possibility for differential public-private selection
depending on the union status of the local public schools.
10
County demographic and economic characteristics used as instruments in the first-stage selection
model include the county population, median household income, dummy variables denoting whether the
student’s family income exceeds $50,000 or $100,000, percentage of residents in poverty, percentage of
residents who are nonwhite, percentage of adults with a bachelor’s degree, and the violent crime rate.
11
To account for interactions between various measures of heterogeneity in the local population and
individual family characteristics, we also include interactions between median household income and
dummy variables for whether the student’s family income exceeds $50,000 or $100,000 (in 1988); the
percentage nonwhite and the student’s race; the percentage of adults with bachelor’s degrees and a
dummy variable reflecting whether both of the student’s parents have bachelor’s degrees (or, in the case
of a single-parent household, whether the custodial parent has a bachelor’s degree). County school
characteristics include a Herfindahl index of the concentration of public-school districts in the county,
12
and the average student-teacher ratios for the public- and private-school sectors in the county, weighted
by enrollment. In addition, we control for the dispersion of 1990 house prices in the county by including
the coefficient of variation.
13
Again, the final set of instruments satisfy two criteria: Each instrument offers significant
incremental explanatory power in determining sector choice, but does not directly enter the second-stage12
Due to data confidentiality requirements, we are not permitted to reveal herein the algorithm used to
14
identify private schools. Those with authorized access to the NELS may request details.
Results are essentially identical if we expand the Catholic-school sector to include all religious private
15
schools. The first column of Table 2 reports Catholic school results to permit direct comparisons for studies that
considered only Catholic schools.
In addition to the percentage of Catholics in the county, Evans and Schwab (1995, 1996) also use
16
Catholic religious affiliation of the family as an instrument. Table 2 counts Catholic religion as a control variable,
not an instrument, consistent with our instrument validity tests. See footnote 6.
achievement equations at a significant level. Consequently, the estimates are relatively insensitive to the
inclusion or exclusion of individual instruments.
Predictive Power for Sector Selection
County-level variables can be included in the sector-selection equations because we identify not
only the public schools in the NELS, but also, with virtual certainty, the locations of the private schools,
which are not otherwise identified in the NELS. To identify locations of private schools, we use reported
characteristics common to both the NELS school survey and those in a veritable census of private
schools produced by Dun and Bradstreet.
14
The payoff to using these detailed geographic-specific characteristics, rather than the instruments
used by previous authors, is substantial, as can be seen in Table 2. The first row of Table 2 presents the
percentage of Catholic-school students (or all private-school students) that a model including all of the
control variables used in the second-stage achievement function regressions would predict to select into
the Catholic- (or all private-) school sector, in two-sector models akin to those used by prior authors.
15
The control variables correctly predict 5 percent of the Catholic-school students and 21 percent of all
private-school students. The next five rows of Table 2 present these “percent correct” calculations, and
the incremental predictive improvement based upon the instrument sets, in turn, of Evans and Schwab
(1995, 1996), Sander and Krautmann (1995), Sander (1996), Neal (1997), and Goldhaber (1996), for the
private-school sectors they consider.  The incremental predictive power of these instrument sets ranges
1613
TABLE 2
Performance of Instrument Sets Used to Identify Selection
(Percentage Correctly Predicted Based upon NELS-88 Data)
Incremental Incremental
Catholic Improvement Over All Private Improvement Over
Variables Used Schools Base Controls Schools Base Controls
Base controls (includes
religion) 5 — 21 —
Evans/Schwab (1995,1996)
instruments 8 3 n/a n/a
Sander/Krautmann (1995)
instruments 5 0 n/a n/a
Sander (1996) instruments 11 6 n/a n/a
Neal (1997) instruments 10 5 n/a n/a
Goldhaber (1996) instruments 7 2 29 8
Pooled set of all instruments
above 18 13 29 8
Instruments used in this paper 38 33 49 28
Note: An entry of n/a indicates that the study did not apply to that sector. Neal (1997) includes some
variables as regressors that are included in our instrument list.14
This characterization of Neal’s (1997) instrument set is not quite correct, since several of our instruments,
17
most notably the urban status variables, are also used by Neal as second-stage variables. Neal’s variable set,
including instruments, correctly explains about 15 percent of selection into Catholic schools in our data. 
from 0 to 8 percentage points, depending on the instrument set and private-school sector in question.
17
Since previous authors use different sets of instruments, one can also gauge the incremental predictive
power of the set of all prior instruments used by previous authors. This pooled set of instruments yields a
13 percentage-point improvement over the control variables in predicting Catholic-school enrollment and
an 8 percentage-point improvement in predicting private-school enrollment. Ludwig (1997) uses a
different approach, but arrives at a similar conclusion—that prior authors’ instruments may not be
particularly strong indicators of sector selection.
Contrast these incremental predictive improvements with those obtained from our set of
instruments: 33 percentage points for the Catholic-school sector (2.9 times the incremental power of the
set of all previously used instruments) and 28 percentage points for all private schools together (3.9 times
the incremental power of Goldhaber’s (1996) instruments). If, instead, we were to compare the
incremental amount of the variance explained, we would find that while previous authors’ instrument
sets improve R  by between 0.005 and 0.04 (the controls explain about 21 percent of the variance in the
2
Catholic-public choice and 16 percent of the variance in the overall private-public choice), our
instrument set improves the pseudo-R  by about 0.14 in the Catholic-public choice and by about 0.19 in
2
the private-public choice. Hence, our instruments substantially improve sector prediction over those used
by previous authors.
Multinomial-logit estimates require the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). Given the nature of school-sector selection, it is questionable as to whether a four-sector selection
model necessarily satisfies this criterion. The null hypothesis of independence of irrelevant alternatives is
rejected at the 4.9 percent level, which in practice is not an egregious violation of the IIA assumption.
Also, one can assess the logit estimates by examining how many of the students predicted to choose one15
sector are then predicted to switch to another sector when a third sector is omitted as a choice. This group
of “IIA violators” is quite small. Omitting private nonreligious schools as a choice, for example, results
in a sector switch for less than one-half of 1 percent of the students (12 of the 4,442 initially assigned to
the public sector, and 10 of the 383 assigned to the religious school sector). Consequently, second-stage
estimates, too, are essentially unchanged.
First-Stage Results: Determinants of Sector Selection
While the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relative performance of public and private
schools, the determinants of sector selection are interesting in their own right. Therefore, while we do not
present the full set of parameter estimates from the multinomial logit sector selection model in this paper
(interested readers may request them from the authors), a brief discussion of some of the first-stage
results is in order.
Unsurprisingly, given the large improvements in sector-selection explanatory power reported in
Table 2, our community-level variables are significantly related to sector choice. The signs on the
coefficients in the sector-selection equations are consistent with our priors. For instance, the higher the
crime rate in the county, the more likely families are to send their children to private schools in either
sector, all else equal. The more concentrated are the public schools in the county, or the higher the public
school student to teacher ratios, the more likely parents are to send their children to private schools, and
particularly, private nonreligious schools. The higher the private sector student-teacher ratios in the
county, the more likely parents are to send their children to public schools. Students who have a local
religious-school option in their religion are more likely to attend a religious private school and are less
likely to attend a nonreligious private school, all else equal.
Also important are the interactions between community characteristics and the student’s own
characteristics. For instance, while minorities and whites are equally likely to attend private school, all16
Results are virtually unchanged if the x’s are taken from the relevant private sector.
18
else equal, their responses to increases in the community’s minority population apparently differ
substantially: the larger the minority fraction in the population, the more likely that white students will
attend a private school, and particularly a nonreligious private school. Parents with bachelor’s degrees
are typically more likely to send their children to private school, but this tendency is diminished
(particularly for religious school selection) as the fraction of adults in the community with bachelor’s
degrees increases. Similarly, while high-income parents are more likely to send their children to private
schools, their tendency to do so (for nonreligious schools, at least) decreases with the median income in
the community. Therefore, we find strong evidence that parents are responsive to community
characteristics, and particularly to interactions between community characteristics and their own
characteristics, when choosing their children’s schooling sector.
3. ESTIMATED PRIVATE-SCHOOL TREATMENT EFFECTS
We are interested in addressing the question, How much will public-school students with a
particular set of individual and family characteristics improve his or her mathematics or science test
performance if the student moves to either a religious or nonreligious private school in the relevant
sector? Here, we assume that the student only takes his or her own characteristics to the private school,
but takes along no school or peer-group characteristics. Again, our conceptual experiment is to place
otherwise equivalent students in different school environments. The calculated treatment effect of a
particular sector k is ￿ (￿  - ￿ )·x , for all second-stage regressors c, where ￿  and ￿  are regression cc k c 0 c 0 c k c 0
coefficients (including the constant terms) in sectors k and 0 and the x’s represent mean values of the
public sector.
1817
Much of the policy debate has centered on mathematics and science, but we also estimate differences in
19
reading, correcting for sector selection. These auxiliary estimates are insignificantly positive for nonreligious
schools and negative for religious private schools, in comparison to public schools. 
Table 3 presents estimated treatment effects (and asymptotic standard errors) in mathematics and
science of religious and nonreligious private schools. The first column reports the raw differences in test
scores, repeated from Table 1. The second column presents the estimated treatment effects with controls
for observed differences in characteristics but without correction for selection. The third column reports
the estimated treatment effects in a model that corrects for selection. The fourth and fifth columns repeat
columns two and three, with 10th-grade test scores excluded from the model, so that the achievement
reflects the full high school gain from the 8th to 10th grade. Appendix 2 reports sample sizes for these
and other specifications below.
When one fails to correct for sector selection, the religious-school treatment effect is positive
and statistically significant for both mathematics and science test scores. All else equal, these results
suggest that public school students will on average perform 2.4 percent better in mathematics and 1.4
percent better in science if they move to a religious private school. However, estimated treatment effects
for nonreligious private schools are small and statistically insignificant. After selection correction,
however, the positive religious-school treatment effects go away, due to significant positive selection
into the sector. In fact, results in column 3 suggest that students in public schools perform somewhat
worse in mathematics and science if they move to a religious private school, -7.0 and -2.4 percent,
respectively, in mathematics and science, measured relative to the public sector.  On the other hand,
19
there is significantly negative selection into nonreligious private schools, and estimated treatment effects
for increase relative to those in column 2. They are now significantly positive for both mathematics and
science (2.2 and 2.7 percent, respectively, relative to public schools).18
TABLE 3
Estimated Treatment Effects by School Sector, With and Without Sector-Selection Correction
(Comparison Group: Public Schools)
Estimated Treatment Effects Estimated Treatment Effects
Raw Score        (10th to 12th Grades)              (8th to 12th Grades)       
Difference No Correction Correction No Correction Correction
(1)           (2)        (3)           (4)        (5)
I. Math Test Scores
(1) Religious vs. public 0.127** 0.019** -0.070** 0.011* -0.089**
(0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
(2) Nonreligious 0.258** 0.005 0.022** 0.053** 0.073**
private vs. public (0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
II. Science Test Scores
(1) Religious vs. public 0.073** 0.016** -0.024** 0.031** -0.059**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
(2) Nonreligious
private vs. public 0.196** -0.006 0.027** 0.045** 0.114**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Treatment effects are the estimated (logarithmic) percentage improvement in 12th-grade test
scores predicted for an average student in the unionized public sector who switches enrollment to the
relevant other sector. An entry of 0.019, for example, signifies an approximate 1.9 percent difference
between the sectors. Asymptotic, robust standard errors are in parentheses beneath the estimated
treatment effects.  See text for details, Appendix 1 for variable definitions,, and Appendix 2 for sample
sizes.19
Eighth- to Twelfth-Grade Achievement
The preceding estimates control for the student’s 10th-grade test scores, but suppose that most of
the value added of private schools occurs in the first two years of high school. This might occur for many
reasons, perhaps because for many students the transition from middle school (or junior high school) is a
critical period, or because the peer effects of private schools are strongest early on. If so, then controlling
for the 10th-grade score would understate the true effect of private high schools. Alternatively, much of
the benefit of high schools might accrue in the latter two years for other students. High-achieving
students, for example, might be more challenged in the latter two years, as they have the opportunity to
study at an advanced level. In addition, the peer-group effects for students who complete the latter two
years may be stronger because some disruptive or low-achieving students may have dropped out, since
the second year of high school often coincides with the end of mandatory attendance requirements. 
To address these and other possibilities, one can repeat all analyses, this time omitting 10th-
grade test scores from both the selection and second-stage regressions, so that achievement reflects the
full high-school period. In this case, the selection-corrected estimates, presented in column 5 of Table 3,
are slightly more negative than before for religious schools in both mathematics and science, but are
much more strongly positive for nonreligious schools. The latter result suggests that the first two years in
a nonreligious private school are more important than the last two, as compared to public
schools—perhaps due to differential patterns in peer-group effects or to greater specialization available
in the last two years of public high schools. Dropouts from public high schools, for example, are
particularly low achievers, in comparison both to continuing students in public high schools and even to
dropouts from private schools, based upon initial 8th-grade test scores.
Based on these results, we can draw several tentative conclusions. First, the private-public raw
score differences are much larger for both religious and nonreligious private school sectors than are the
estimated treatment effects without corrections for nonrandom selection. That is, most of the raw20
Neal (1997) suggests that religious treatment effects may vary substantially across different types of
20
urban areas.
difference in test scores is due to differences in observable characteristics between the public and private
sectors. However, religious-school treatment effects, in either mathematics or science, are even lower
after we correct for selection, while nonreligious private-school treatment effects are higher. Hence,
failure to correct for selection leads to an overstatement of the religious-school treatment effects in both
mathematics and science, but to an understatement of treatment effects for nonreligious private schools,
especially for gains from the 8th to 10thgrades. Significantly, these estimated treatment effects are
 
qualitatively the same if one restricts the sample to exclude public-school students who live in counties
where no private schools are present, or if one substitutes the 10th-grade test score as the dependent
variable to avoid potential selection problems with dropouts in the last two years of high school (since
mandatory attendance laws typically apply through the 10th grade).
Urban Differences in Treatment Effects
Although urban status is a valid exclusion restriction in our data, in that urban variables are not
significantly associated with student achievement after correcting for selection, we experiment with
specifications that allow public-private treatment effects to differ by urban status.  One might speculate,
20
for example, that treatment effect differentials are larger in densely populated urban areas, i.e., that
private schools are relatively better than public schools in populous urban areas than elsewhere. Many
critics of public schools suggest, for example, that urban public schools, particularly in the most densely
populated areas, are particularly ineffective, for a variety of reasons.
Estimated treatment-effect differentials are virtually identical, however, whether or not we
control for urban status directly in the second stage, or estimate entirely separate models looking only at21
Private nonreligious school treatment effects are slightly—but statistically significantly—higher in large
21
central cities than in the general population.
The invariance of estimated treatment differentials with respect to urban status also suggests, at least
22
indirectly, that intraurban household location decisions are unlikely to affect treatment differentials.
Thanks to Dennis Epple for pointing out this possibility to us.
23
students residing in either large metropolitan areas or large central cities.  After correction for selection
21
bias, then, private-school treatment effects do vary considerably depending upon the urban status of the
community in question. If urban public schools are particularly ineffective, the private schools in the
same area appear to be affected too, so that treatment differentials are unaffected.
22
Because our instruments rely on the county as the geographical unit of variation, our results
might be sensitive to the potential for endogenous household location choice within a multicounty
metropolitan area.  Ideally, we could jointly model household location choice and school sector
23
selection, but the instruments needed to do this are not apparent. Instead, we attempt two methods of
“aggregating over” the potential problem of endogenous location choice. First, we replace all county-
level instruments with metropolitan area-level instruments. Second, we replace all county-level
instruments with instruments based on the county and all of its contiguous urban neighbor counties (for
urban counties only). In both cases, the estimated treatment effects of religious and nonreligious schools
are extremely similar to those where we use county-level geographic variation for identification. The
only difference is that while the “replacement” specifications still yield strongly statistically significant
results, they are somewhat less precisely estimated than before (the standard errors are, on average, 15
percent higher). Hence, it is very unlikely that our results are being driven by intraurban household
location choice.
Union-Nonunion Differences in Treatment Effects
Until now, we have assumed that differences in unionization patterns of public schools are not
important in measuring the difference in treatment effects of public and private schools. Work by Eberts22
A state is designated as “union-dominated” if the state has a duty-to-bargain law; among schools in our
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sample, over 95 percent of public school students in these states attend unionized schools. A state is “not union-
dominated” if it does not have such a law; fewer than one-third of sampled students in these states attend unionized
schools. As an even more restrictive threshold, we consider whether the state has no duty-to-bargain law, but does
have a right-to-work law. In these states, fewer than 15 percent of our sampled students, almost exclusively in
cities, attend unionized public schools.
While this result is consistent with the findings of Hoxby (1996), who estimates a negative union effect
25
on achievement for public schools, it is not directly comparable, since we do not estimate differences in technical
efficiency (i.e., achievement differentials with school input levels held constant). 
and Stone (1987) and more recently Hoxby (1996) and Peltzman (1996), however, suggests that union
and nonunion schools differ systematically. If so, then public-private achievement differences may also
depend on the union status of public schools.
To address this possibility, we explore several specifications to gauge the union-nonunion
difference in the private-public treatment effect: (1) introducing a union-status dummy variable to the
second-stage achievement regression for public schools; (2) estimating a four-sector model, similar in all
respects to the three-sector model above, except that we distinguish the union and nonunion public
sectors in both the selection and achievement equations; and (3) estimating three-sector models, as
above, but in which we consider selection and achievement separately in states with schools dominated
by teacher unions versus states with very few teacher unions.
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In all three cases, we find that the private-public school treatment effects differ significantly in
statistical terms, depending on whether the public sector is unionized or not, but that the magnitude of
the differences is small. Private-school treatment effects are generally between one and two percentage
points larger (or less negative) in union public schools, as compared to nonunion public schools,
significantly so in each case at the 10 percent level or better.  Therefore, the estimated religious-school
25
treatment effect remains significantly negative relative to both union and nonunion schools, but is
modestly less negative when the relevant comparison is to the nonunion sector. 23
Student-Level Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects
Average treatment effects may not be representative for all population subgroups. Therefore, we
explore heterogeneity in treatment effects by repeating the entire analysis for various subgroups. Table 4
reports estimated treatment effects in mathematics for five distinct subgroups: black and Hispanic
students; students with family incomes over $50,000 and below $25,000; and students in the bottom and
top thirds of the 8th-grade mathematics test score distribution. The entire analysis is repeated for each
subgroup, i.e., we estimate a new two-stage model using only the observations in the relevant subgroup.
Sample sizes for each subgroup are reported by sector in Appendix 2.
Religious-school treatment effects, corrected for selection, remain significantly negative for both
low-achieving and low-income students. High-achieving and high-income students appear not to fare any
better or worse in religious schools, relative to public schools. For black and Hispanic students, however,
estimated treatment effects are significantly positive, and particularly strong for science achievement.
Although only 8th- to 12th-grade treatment effects are presented in Table 4, results for 10th- to 12th-
grade treatment effects generally follow similar patterns.
The positive effects of religious schools for black and Hispanic students are consistent with Neal
(1997), who finds that Catholic schools have a positive, significant effect on black and Hispanic student
performance (measured as a reduced risk of dropping out)—but primarily in big cities—and no
substantial effect for the general student population. Evidence presented by Neal suggests that the
positive gains to black and Hispanic students who attend religious schools arise from the poor quality of
public-school alternatives in large cities. Most of the minorities in our sample come from urban areas;
however, given the importance of Neal’s result, we also investigated whether the minority treatment
effect is different in urban areas, or in large cities. We find that the religious school treatment effect is
even stronger for blacks and Hispanics in urban areas, and particularly in large central cities, though
these results are based on very small sample sizes. Hence, while there is apparently no difference in the24
TABLE 4
Alternative Specifications of Private-School Treatment Effects (8th to 12th Grades)
(Comparison Group: Public Schools)
     Estimated Treatment Effects    Estimated Treatment Effects
               (Mathematics)                                  (Science)                  
Religious Nonreligious Religious Nonreligious
Private Private Private Private
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Black, and Hispanic 0.139** n/a 0.110** n/a
students (0.020) (0.021)
(2) Income > $50,000 -0.012 0.007 -0.018 0.054**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014)
(3) Income < $25,000 -0.074** 0.057** -0.058** 0.131**
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.026)
(4) Top third, 8th-grade -0.066** 0.003 -0.083** -0.032**
scores (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
(5) Bottom third, -0.078** 0.118** -0.034** 0.114**
8th-grade scores (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021)
* significant at the 10 percent level, * indicates significant at the 5 percent level.
n/a = Model not estimated because 10th-grade scores are excluded.
Notes: The treatment effects are the estimated (logarithmic percentage improvement in 12th-grade test
scores predicted for the mean student (in the relevant group) in the public sector who switches
enrollment to the religious sector. An entry of 0.139, for example, indicates an approximate 13.9 percent
difference between the sectors. Asymptotic, robust standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated
treatment effects. See text for details, Appendix 1 for definitions of variables, and Appendix 2 for sample
sizes.25
general population between the religious school treatment effects across urban status, we find that,
consistent with Neal (1997), for blacks and Hispanics there do seem to be real differences across urban
status.
The relatively positive effects of religious schools for students from high-income families appear
to stem from the fact that these students tend to attend higher-quality religious schools, as measured by a
number of factors. Relative to the religious schools attended by students with parental incomes below
$50,000, for example, the religious schools attended by high-income students pay teachers 14 percent
more (throughout the salary schedule), have 16 percent smaller classes, and send 15 percent more of their
students on to four-year colleges and universities. In addition, among Catholic-school students, high-
income students are much more likely to attend a religious-order school, rather than a diocesan school.
(Differences are significant at the 1 percent level.)
Nonreligious private-school treatment effects, corrected for selection, remain significantly
positive for 8th- to 12th-grade achievement for both low-income and initially low-achieving students, but
are substantially lower for high-income or initially high-achieving students. (High-achieving students
may actually fare worse in science.) These differential treatment effects by income and achievement
level could arise from strong peer-group effects in nonreligious private schools, or perhaps from more
specialized courses available to advanced students in public high schools. We should emphasize,
however, that the private nonreligious school sample sizes for the low-income and low-achievement
groups are very small (47 and 39, respectively). The positive effects for low-income and low-achieving
students, however, are also consistent with positive treatment effects estimated by Rouse (1996) for
elementary school participants in the Milwaukee school-choice program.
In sum, the estimates provide strong, consistent evidence that failure to correct for selection
leads to a substantial overstatement of the religious-school treatment effect. If anything, religious private
schools are less productive than public schools in either mathematics or science. However, religious26
schools do seem to have positive treatment effects for black and Hispanic students. Our results, therefore,
call into question previous findings of a positive overall treatment effect for religious schools, but are in
partial agreement with the findings of Neal (1997). Private nonreligious schools, on the other hand,
appear to have positive treatment effects for most students, primarily for low-income and initially low-
achieving students.
Reconciliation with Prior Results
Our results differ substantially from those of a number of prior studies, perhaps most notably
Evans and Schwab (1995, 1996), who find significantly positive treatment effects for Catholic schools,
and Goldhaber (1996), who finds no significant treatment effect for private schools. However, the data
differ (we use NELS, while most others, except Goldhaber, use either the High School and Beyond or the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, both from earlier periods); the dependent variables differ (Neal
1997, and Evans and Schwab 1995, use the probability of dropping out of high school as their dependent
variable); and the specification and instrumentation of school sectors differ. Results here would be
bolstered by additional evidence that differences are due to more precise specification and estimation of
sector selection, rather than to idiosyncratic differences in data or dependent variable.
One possible reconciliation with Goldhaber’s results is straightforward, because he pools the
selection equations for religious and nonreligious private schools, finding no significant selection in the
second-stage achievement equations. Here, we specify separate selection equations for religious and
nonreligious private schools, and find significantly positive selection into religious schools, but
significantly negative selection into nonreligious schools. Hence, pooling the two private-sector selection
equations appears to confound the opposing positive and negative selections into religious and
nonreligious schools, respectively.27
For consistency with Evans and Schwab, we exclude religion from the second-stage in this exercise.
26
To reconcile our results with those of Evans and Schwab and others, we reestimate the models,
applying to our data and dependent variable the instruments used by previous authors whose results are
at odds with ours. Consider an approximation to the Evans and Schwab specification, in which one uses
Catholic religion and Catholic concentration in the county as the instruments.  When one adopts this
26
identification strategy, the estimated religious- (or Catholic-) school mathematics and science treatment
effects are 2.1 and 2.8 percent, respectively, relative to public schools, both statistically significant at
conventional levels. These results are consistent with the Evans and Schwab finding of a positive
treatment effect for Catholic schools, as well as negative selection into Catholic schools. With Sander’s
(1996) instruments (i.e., interactions between Catholic religion, urbanicity, and region), the estimated
treatment effects in mathematics relative to public schools are 3.2 percent. While Sander’s reported
positive treatment effect for Catholic schools is statistically insignificant, his estimated treatment effect
increases when correcting for selection, which is also what we find when his instruments are applied to
our data and dependent variable. Therefore, a substantial part of the differences between the findings
here and those of previous authors are attributable to differences in the variables used to instrument for
sector selection.
Another major difference between the approach taken here and that taken by Neal (1997) or
Evans and Schwab (1995) is that they estimate the probability of dropping out of high school, rather than
using  test scores, as the performance measure for schools. Evans and Schwab correctly note that high
school graduation is strongly related to future labor market success, but there is also substantial evidence
that cognitive test scores are related to labor market success (e.g., Bishop 1989; Murnane, Willett, and
Levy 1995). Furthermore, Neal and Johnson (1996) show that black-white differences in test scores
explain a substantial portion of the black-white wage gap. That said, the NELS at this time does not28
The use of a linear probability model in the second stage permits an expedient correction for sample
27
selection for the binary dropout variable; in this case, correction for heteroskedastic errors is appropriate.
permit one to measure with certainty whether students eventually drop out of high school. Definitive
evidence of high school completion will come with release of the 1994 wave of the NELS (two years
after on-time graduation), but the 1994 NELS wave was not available at the time of this writing.
Therefore, to date, NELS users can only observe dropouts before the 12th-grade survey was conducted.
Despite the fact that dropout probabilities through graduation are not available in the NELS, one
can observe whether or not students drop out before the 12th-grade survey. Thus, one can reestimate the
full model, using a second-stage linear probability model with heteroskedasticity-corrected errors, where
the dependent variable is the probability of dropping out before the 12th-grade survey and the control
and sample-selection variables are as before.  In this specification, religious-school students are 1.15
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percentage points less likely to drop out by the 12th-grade survey than public-school students. While this
result is not statistically significant (the standard error of the estimated treatment effect is 1.140), it
provides at least some suggestive evidence that religious schools may be modestly more likely to keep
students enrolled in school than are public schools. However, our point that Evans and Schwab (1995)
may overstate the religious school treatment effect is apparently valid here too: the estimated treatment
effect of religious schools is more than twice as large in magnitude (and is statistically significant) if we
use Evans and Schwab’s instrumenting strategy in this application. Once the 1994 wave of the NELS is
released, it will be possible to gauge with more reliability whether private schools are associated with an
increased probability of high school completion, and one can explore this possibility.
More on the Validity of Catholic Religion as an Instrument
Estimated treatment effects of religious schools are significantly positive when Catholic religion
is used as an instrument and excluded from the achievement equation, but negative when it is not29
excluded from the achievement equation. What might cause this divergent result? Suppose that different
types of Catholics select into Catholic schools than into public schools. If Catholics with stronger
unobserved abilities or motivation tend to select into Catholic schools rather than into public schools,
then it becomes easier to reconcile our results to those of Evans and Schwab.
Catholic students as a group perform at a significantly lower level on eighth-grade standardized
tests than non-Catholic students, even after we control for the wide range of observable demographic and
economic characteristics used in our achievement equations. This result squares with the finding of
negative selection into Catholic schools reported by Evans and Schwab and others. But are the one-
quarter of Catholics who go to Catholic school equivalent to the three-quarters of Catholics who go to
public school in terms of ability or motivation (after one partials out observable demographic
characteristics)? The answer in our data is no. Catholic students who attend Catholic schools initially
perform at a 3 percent higher level (statistically significant) in the 8th grade than Catholic students who
attend public schools, with other observable characteristics held constant. If one fails to control for these
other characteristics, the initial test-performance differential is even more stark—11 percent, and
significant at any reasonable threshold. So among Catholic students, there is evidence of positive
selection into Catholic schools.
One can certainly heap criticism on a test of this sort. It is likely that children attending Catholic
school in the 8th grade are also more likely to have gone to Catholic elementary schools. (We have no
way of gauging this in our data.) If this were the case, then one could still possibly interpret the results
from the preceding paragraph as evidence that Catholic schools make a positive difference, but earlier in
the schooling process—not in high schools. Catholic children who are high achievers by the 8th grade
may have gotten there because they attended Catholic schools. If so, one would expect that the initial
performance differential among Catholics to persist even for students who select into Catholic schools
for reasons that are plausibly exogenous.30
Instead, we find that the differential narrows when we examine specific, plausibly exogenous
motivations for enrolling in Catholic schools, suggesting that there is unobserved positive selection into
Catholic schools. We observe, for example, parental responses to questions about the importance of a
religious college environment for their child. While this exercise is also not perfect, it may be instructive.
The positive gap in initial achievement between Catholics attending Catholic schools and those attending
public schools is only half as large among students whose parents state that a religious college
environment is very important, as among those whose parents say it is not. An even sharper distinction is
evident if one splits the Catholic sample by those parents who say that a low-crime environment is very
important, versus those who do not. Indeed, there is no difference in initial achievement between
Catholics attending Catholic and public schools who say that a low-crime environment is very important
for their children, while the performance difference is over 3 percent, all else equal, for those who say
that a low-crime environment is not very important. Hence, arguments that these 8th-grade differences
are due primarily to Catholic elementary school attendance seem unlikely.
Another way of gauging whether Catholics who attend Catholic school are more motivated than
Catholics who attend public school may be to observe usage of libraries and museums. Catholic students
who attend Catholic schools have parents who are 14 percent more likely to borrow books from libraries
and 37 percent more likely to visit art museums than are Catholic students who attend public schools.
Since both parental library usage and museum visitation are strongly positively correlated with initial
student achievement, this pattern provides additional evidence that Catholics who attend Catholic
schools are of higher ability than are Catholics who select into public schools. Moreover, we find that,
regardless of quartile of 8th-grade achievement (with observed characteristics partialed out, as before),
Catholic students who attend Catholic schools are still significantly more likely than other Catholic
students to have parents who borrow library books or visit art museums.31
In sum, while our conclusions regarding the role of Catholic religion in sector selection and
achievement are not ironclad, we contend that the suggestive evidence presented above points in our
favor. The fact that in our data Catholics have lower initial test performance, holding constant observable
characteristics, provides a potential explanation for why studies that use Catholic religion or percentage
Catholic in the county as instruments might find evidence of negative selection into Catholic schools.
But there exists considerable heterogeneity among Catholics, and we find evidence that Catholics who
send their children to Catholic school may be more motivated, or more academically oriented, than
Catholics who send their children to public schools. Hence, we find positive selection into the religious
sector.
4. SOME QUESTIONS—AND POTENTIAL ANSWERS
Our key results raise at least two questions worthy of further pursuit. First, why do public
schools compare so favorably, or at least as well, to religious schools in mathematics and science
achievement? Second, why do parents choose to send their children to private schools even when there
are no positive differences in academic performance between public and private schools for their
children, i.e., for most students attending religious schools and high-income and initially high-achieving
student subgroups in nonreligious private schools?
One can address the first question by exploring some of the ways in which public and religious
schools differ. Evidence on science instruction may be particularly informative. In the NELS data, public
and religious schools are equally likely to have a science major teaching science courses, but in other
dimensions there are considerable differences. With standard controls for observable demographic
characteristics, for example, students in religious schools in our sample take significantly fewer high
school science courses, according to transcript data. Moreover, when they do take science courses, the32
courses they take appear to fall short of science courses in public schools along a number of dimensions.
Compared to science classes in religious schools, for instance, science classes in public schools average
11.3 percent more class time per week and 11.6 percent more lab time, and are 41.4 percent more likely
to have experiments at least twice per week. All of these results are statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
In addition, Betts (1996) reports that student academic achievement is strongly positively related
to the amount of homework assigned, provided that some of the work is graded and returned. Although
science teachers in public and religious schools in the NELS assign about the same amount of homework
per week, science teachers in public schools are 9.6 percent more likely to grade and return homework
than their religious-school counterparts. Therefore, based on this evidence, public-school students may
have higher-quality science instruction than that received by religious-school students.
While there are not as many objective measures of differences in mathematics quality between
public and religious schools as for science quality, we find similar differences with regard to
mathematics quality. As in the case of science, after controlling for observable demographic
characteristics, we find that students in religious schools take significantly fewer college-preparatory
mathematics courses, have 8 percent less weekly mathematics class time, and are less likely to have
homework graded and returned than are students in public schools. Hence, the public-religious school
differences apparent with science instruction are visible with mathematics as well.
The next question involves why parents might send their children to private schools, even if
public school productivity is as high as or higher than that of private schools for their children. One
answer is that student academic achievement is but one of many outcomes of schooling about which
parents might care. For instance, parents might seek a more disciplined environment for their children,
might desire for their children to have a religious education, or might desire a higher probability that
their children will be able to participate substantively in extracurricular activities. In addition, parents33
might wish for their children to interact with a certain peer group. Peer group differences are clear:
Religious schools, and nonreligious private schools in particular, have students with significantly higher
than average socioeconomic status levels and who are significantly more likely to have plans for college.
Religious preferences are also apparent: Parents of students who attend religious schools are
substantially more likely to be religiously active than their public-school counterparts. Presumably,
religious instruction or at least a religious environment makes religious schools more attractive to such
parents.
Other suspected differences are apparently present as well, in both religious and nonreligious
private schools. Private schools tend to have substantially higher discipline levels than public schools:
Private schools in our sample, for instance, are 245 percent more likely than public schools to expel
students for possession of alcohol, 170 percent more likely to expel students for injuring others, and 62
percent more likely to expel students who bring weapons to school. These heightened discipline policies
likely lead to an increased sense of security that most parents desire for their children. Beyond these
disciplinary and security issues, we find that private-school students are 28 percent more likely than
public-school students to participate in extracurricular sports, cheerleading, school government, school
yearbook or newspaper, or school-sponsored musical or dramatic activities, and are 48 percent more
likely to spend at least five hours per week on extracurricular activities (both significant at the 1 percent
level). Hence, private-school students apparently have more opportunities to participate meaningfully in
a broader range of other school-day and extracurricular activities.
Therefore, even when private schools are not more beneficial academically in terms of
mathematics and science achievement, they appear to offer other advantages (e.g., perceived peer-group
benefits, religious education, opportunities for extracurricular participation, and increased discipline and
security) that are also important to many parents. Thus, it is not surprising that parents may still choose34
to send their children to private school, even if there is no advantage to their particular children in terms
of standard academic achievement.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Private schools may have a number of advantages over public schools. They offer, for parents
who desire it, considerably more religious education than would be available in public schools. Private-
schools offer a potentially different peer group than do public schools: Private-school students are more
likely to have college ambitions and come from high-socioeconomic status families. Private schools
offer a more disciplined (and probably more secure) learning environment, and offer more opportunities
for meaningful participation in extracurricular activities for the students who desire to do so. It is also
widely believed that private schools are generally academically superior to public schools.
We find evidence to support this last belief, but only if the private school is nonreligious. Only
for minorities do we find that religious private schools outperform public schools, after we correct for
sector selection. We find a positive religious-school treatment effect for black and Hispanic students for
gains from the 8th to 12th grades, a result consistent with Neal’s (1997) finding that Catholic schools
particularly benefit urban black and Hispanic students. We also find evidence that religious schools may
benefit students from families with high incomes, in part because high-income families select higher-
quality religious schools. However, in all other population groups that we investigated, we found
negative, or at best statistically zero, estimated effects of religious schools. Therefore, we have little
reason to believe that religious schools lead in general to higher academic achievement than do public
schools.
Evidence that nonreligious private schools outperform public schools, however, is substantially
stronger. In the general population, the estimated nonreligious private-school treatment effect is positive,35
particularly in the early high-school grades. Consistent with recent work on the Milwaukee school-choice
program, the positive effects are most substantial for low-income and initially low-achieving students.
The beneficial effects of nonreligious private schools for these groups in the early high school grades
suggest that peer-group effects disproportionately benefit these students, and also perhaps that public
high schools serve advanced students relatively well in the latter high-school years.
But even a negative religious-school treatment effect may not be inconsistent with religious
schools being better than public schools in another academic dimension. Private schools—and
particularly, religious schools—tend to spend far less per student than do their public-school
counterparts. If religious schools yield nearly comparable performance at lower cost, then one might still
conclude that they are more cost-efficient than public schools. Our results seem to indicate that the
results of religious-school competition, if present, may be found predominantly in the cost, rather than
the quality, dimension of education provision, at least in terms of standard academic achievement.
Finally, our results should be used with caution if applied to the voucher debate. The estimated
treatment effects only simulate the effect of moving a marginal student from the public sector to the
private sector (or vice versa). Thus, characteristics of each school (including peer characteristics
associated with that school) are unchanged. A voucher system, however, would likely change
substantially the composition of public and private schools, e.g., peer-group effects on achievement
might deteriorate in both sectors. In particular, the strong positive treatment effects of nonreligious
private schools, which appear to be concentrated among low-income and initially low-achieving
students, may be especially sensitive to composition changes if the benefits arise from strong peer-group
effects.36APPENDIX 1
Summary Statistics and Data Sources for Explanatory Variables
Variable Data Standard Mean Mean Mean Mean
Definition Source Mean Deviation (Nonunion) (Union) (Religious) (Nonreligious)
Female Student 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.47 0.45
Black Student 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.03
Hispanic Student 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.02
Log 8th-grade math NELS 3.63 0.33 3.56 3.61 3.71 3.91
Log 10th-grade math NELS 3.82 0.32 3.76 3.80 3.91 4.07
Black * female Student 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01
Hispanic * female Student 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.00
Two-parent household Student 0.88 0.32 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.92
Parent often attends religious
services Parent 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.40 0.57 0.36
Socioeconomic status Parent data 0.23 0.80 0.05 0.13 0.54 1.14
Catholic religion Student 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.35 0.66 0.17
Baptist religion Student 0.16 0.36 0.29 0.13 0.06 0.10
Fundamentalist religion Student 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03
Jewish religion Student 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14
Muslim religion Student 0.003 0.05 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.01
Eastern religion Student 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
No rel. affiliation Student 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
Central county in MSA Census 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.64 0.69 0.83
Suburb. county in MSA Census 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.11
Presence of Catholic school
in county D&B 0.75 0.43 0.56 0.79 1.00 0.80
Presence of nonreligious
school in county D&B 0.75 0.43 0.77 0.70 0.83 1.00
Presence of school in student’s
religion in county D&B/student 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.55 0.31 0.71
Herfindahl index of public
school concentration CCD 0.41 0.35 0.52 0.32 0.48 0.54
(table continues)APPENDIX 1, continued
Variable Data Standard Mean Mean Mean Mean
Definition Source Mean Deviation (Nonunion) (Union) (Religious) (Nonreligious)
County population (in millions) Census 0.98 1.78 0.66 0.96 1.54 1.35
Median household income
in county ($10,000's) Census 3.21 0.86 2.81 3.35 3.34 3.26
Percentage poverty in county Census 17.46 9.19 22.02 14.80 18.07 20.48
Percentage nonwhite in county Census 24.69 18.34 28.74 19.39 32.91 37.65
Percentage in county with
bachelor’s degree Census 22.97 8.33 21.45 22.79 24.93 26.71
Percentage with bachelor’s in
county * parents have
bachelor’s degree Census, parents 6.68 12.21 4.85 5.63 24.93 18.59
Percentage nonwhite in
county * student is white Census, student 0.80 0.40 17.87 13.62 26.47 36.24
Median income in
county * family 
income > $50,000 Census, parents 0.50 1.29 0.27 0.35 0.81 2.01
Median income in
county * family
income > $100,000 Census, parents 0.09 0.57 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.54
Family income > $50,000 Parents 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.60
Family income > $100,000 Parents 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.16
Violent crime rate in county
(per 100 residents) CCDB 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.68 0.90
Mean student-teacher ratio in
county, public schools CCD 17.82 2.59 17.41 17.84 18.59 17.79
Mean student-teacher ratio in
county, private schools D&B 18.00 2.99 16.28 18.87 18.22 17.12
Coefficient of variation of
county house prices CCD 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18
(table continues)APPENDIX 1, continued
Variable Data Standard Mean Mean Mean Mean
Definition Source Mean Deviation (Nonunion) (Union) (Religious) (Nonreligious)
Percentage union, manufacturing
workers in state BLS 22.85 13.30 16.47 26.08 22.87 21.01
State right-to-work
law—teachers NBER 0.28 0.45 0.64 0.14 0.23 0.08
State duty-to-bargain 
law—teachers NBER 0.58 0.49 0.10 0.78 0.67 0.60
Notes: “Student” refers to the NELS 10th-grade student survey; “Parent” to the NELS 10th-grade parent survey; “NELS” to the NELS test-score
file; “Census” to the 1990 Census of Population, and Housing, county-level extract; “D&B” to the Dun and Bradstreet data set, matched to the
NELS by the authors; “CCD” to the U.S. Department of Education’s Common Core of Data; “CCDB” to the City-County Data Book; “BLS” to
1988 BLS union coverage data; “NBER” to the NBER Public-Sector Collective-Bargaining Law Data Set.4041
APPENDIX 2
Sample Sizes for Full and Subgroup Specifications
(number of students)
Nonunion Union Religious Nonreligious
Group Public Public Private Private
Full sample 1325 2810 613 345
Black and Hispanic students 396 492 99 16*
Income > $50,000 113 257 133 210
Income < $25,000 702 1360 195 47
Top third, 8th-grade test scores 314 860 236 255
Bottom third, 8th-grade test scores 555 971 133 39
Number of schools 176 374 99 36
* Model not estimated for this subgroup due to small number of observations.4243
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